Boeing 737 Max: Pilots’ Training, MCAS Programming, and the Certification Process

The controversy surrounding the Boeing 737 Max aircraft has led to various discussions on different aspects, including pilot training, the malfunction of the Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS), and the certification process. This article delves into how these elements interact and shape the overall issues with the aircraft.

Was Pilot Training a Big Issue?

Conversations often bring up the question of pilot training, especially considering the crashes involving the 737 Max. While pilot training is indeed a significant aspect, it becomes less relevant if the aircraft manufacturer, Boeing, had accurately briefed airlines and pilots on the MCAS system. Proper training on such a system could have mitigated some of the issues. However, the core issue lies in the communication and disclosure by Boeing.

MCAS Programming: The Root of the Problem?

The MCAS (Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System) plays a critical role in compensating for unexpected scenarios, such as a runaway stabilizer. There are two main factors that make MCAS unique and problematic:

The reliance on a single Angle of Attack (AoA) sensor for MCAS activation, which can lead to unreliable data. The programming issue that involves an excessive nose-down trim, creating confusion and errors during troubleshooting.

These factors contributed to a scenario where pilots were faced with a simultaneous malfunctioning sensor and a severe trimming issue, leading to incorrect decisions or no corrective action at all. The primary mistake was in the design of the MCAS system, which was programmed to override multiple sensor inputs and make rapid, potentially harmful corrections.

The Certification Process and Independent Review

The certification process of the 737 Max was criticized for bypassing the necessary independent engineering review. The certification process is crucial for ensuring the safety and reliability of aircraft. However, the company being run by MBAs (Masters of Business Administration) rather than PhD engineers can lead to such shortcuts. This lack of oversight led to a system that was not thoroughly tested and reviewed, setting the stage for the problems that followed.

The final fix to the MCAS programming is a step towards addressing these issues. Additionally, simulator training for pilots is being implemented to ensure proper understanding and response to similar malfunctions in the future.

Moreover, the one 737 Type Rating for all models means that airline pilots can be quickly transitioned to the Max, but without the specific training required for this model, they might not fully understand the unique features and potential malfunctions. This oversight further highlights the need for a more stringent and comprehensive training program before pilots are assigned to the 737 Max.

In summary, while pilot training is a critical component, it is the system design and certification process that ultimately led to the issues with the Boeing 737 Max. Improving any of these areas—MCAS programming, certification process, or pilot training—can help ensure safer and more reliable aircraft.