The Reality of the National Popular Vote Interstate Compact and Its Deviation from Constitutional Design

One would hope that the possibility of awarding 270 electoral votes based on a national popular vote, as proposed by the National Popular Vote Interstate Compact (NPVIC), would be highly improbable. The compact, while appearing to offer a straightforward way to reform the electoral process, is a significant divergence from the constitutional principles that underpin the U.S. election system.

First and foremost, the NPVIC aims to bypass the amendment process outlined in the U.S. Constitution. Despite being legally permissible, the compact effectively undermines the original intent of the framers who designed the electoral system to reflect the individual opinions of state electors. While some modifications, such as the "winner take all" laws, have been implemented, requiring a state to cast all its electoral votes for the presidential candidate who wins the statewide popular vote, the NPVIC goes a step further.

A Confluence of Constitutional Deviations

The NPVIC argues that the allocation of electoral votes should be based on a national popular vote, thereby negating the will of state voters. This approach involves an artifice that slashes across the essential constitutional design, which places the election of the president in the hands of the states. It is crucial to understand that there is no such thing as a "national election" on presidential election day. Instead, there are 51 independent elections, each commanded by Congress and taking place on the same day.

The Impact on Electoral Coalitions

Under the current system, the President of the United States needs to assemble a broad coalition that includes a mix of big states, small states, rural areas, and urban centers to win 270 electoral votes. This diverse coalition ensures a more balanced and representative outcome. However, the NPVIC would have a significant impact on this balance.

With NPVIC, the President would theoretically only need to concentrate on winning votes in densely populated urban areas, as Hillary Clinton did in the 2016 election, while largely ignoring the rest of the country. This would fundamentally alter the nature of the electoral strategy, potentially leading to a more polarized and less representative outcome.

Ignoring State Preferences

Consider a scenario where the 2016 election had played out slightly differently: if Hillary Clinton had won the majority of states to amass 270 electoral votes but Donald Trump had won the national popular vote, the NPVIC would have required states like California to allocate their electoral votes to Trump instead of Clinton. California’s voters, who overwhelmingly supported Clinton, would have found themselves in a position where their electoral votes would have gone to a candidate they did not support. This violates the principle that state electoral votes should reflect the will of the state’s voters.

Furthermore, the notion of a "national popular vote" is flawed. There is no constitutional provision for such a vote, and it effectively marginalizes the importance of state-level elections, which are critical in forming a diverse and representative electoral outcome.

The Closer Alignment with Constitutional Principles

While the current Electoral College system, with its shortcomings, is designed to approximate the framers' original intent more closely than the NPVIC. The Electoral College ensures that states retain significant power in the electoral process. By concentrating on winning urban areas, the NPVIC shifts the balance of power, potentially undermining the democratic process and the diverse representation that the current system aims to provide.

It is clear that the NPVIC represents a significant departure from the constitutional principle that places the election of the president in the hands of the states. While it may seem appealing in theory, the practical implications are far-reaching and could have detrimental effects on the democratic process.

Therefore, it is essential to carefully consider the implications of the NPVIC before embracing it as a solution to perceived electoral flaws. The current system, while imperfect, offers a more balanced and representative outcome.